Free Example of The Evolutionary Turn on Game Theory Essay

According to the Robert Sudgen’s article, revolutionary game theorists, as opposed to the behavioral theorists, lack an experimental evidence to support their theory. In his argument about the classical game theory, Sudgen states that the criterion that defines the acceptable and unacceptable solutions in a game as a process is not defined fully. He further argues that, in order to be acceptable, the solution must be compatible with the rationality of all game players, which is a matter of their knowledge in the game. In this case, I would agree with the author’s argument. My reasoning is based on the fact that not all players have a similar understanding regarding the game, in terms of rules and tactics. Similarly, in economics, the people involved possess different and unequal levels of understanding of various concepts.

In the application of the Nash equilibrium, which states that each player is believed to choose his/her component of the equilibrium, Cubitt & Sudgen (1998 p. 761–71) argue that it can only be achieved through a repeated game. In my opinion, this is a drawback in the game theory, because the theory can only be applied if the player makes the same or the similar decision. It is only possible if a player chooses the same opponent in every repeated game, in order to earn knowledge on the tactics, which he/she is going to use in defense in certain situations. This might be difficult to achieve.

Evolutionary game theory, as quoted by Sugden in Young’s work (1998), is based on the belief of gaining the experience together with their opponents. However, the theory does not take into consideration the fact that the opponent’s behavior might change in future. It is difficult to predict player’s future behavior. Therefore, the game theory is not accurate, in my opinion. Furthermore, the author did not offer in-depth clarification of the evolutionary game theory. He only relied on the argument of Binmore (1994 p. 67). His explanation can not withstand the scrutiny of serious thinkers, as echoed by Sudgen. Thus, it is difficult for one to apply this theory either in economics or biology.

Binmore (1994 p. 34-41) explains that the entity of the evolutionary game is becoming more fit than the competitors theory, which pertains to producing as numerous imitations of one’s behavior as one may want, and the payoff is deliberated in units of Fitness (which is relative to being able to reproduce). He further argues that it is normally for a multi-player company with an extremely large number of contestants. In classical Game Theory, rules describe the contest; however, for the evolutionary games, rules include element of replicator dynamics. In my view, this theory only exists in the mind. It is only a theory that cannot be applied in any field. The relevance of the game theory to progress has brought insights into human behavior, whereby, game theory typically assumes the rational actors; this does not normally explain individual behavior in the real world. An important characteristic of evolutionary game theory is recurrence. Thus, if games are not supposed to be continual, these evolutionary game models would not be able to provide a meaning into the adaptive behaviors and strategies.

In addition, this application is only meaningful to the economic science, as it provides a basic explanation of the alterations that tend to occur between the two equilibria. Game theory provides a general framework, using which, scientists have a chance to learn and comprehend other people. The observation and how these evolution strategies are applied can slightly help in the economics illuminate processes. Thus, as Robert Sudgen argues, it is interesting to note that the author of the theory and most scholars did not agree with the relevance of evolutionary in economic issues.

Also in Binmore’s (1994 p. 24) arguments, he argued expressly that it is a meme that can be replicated from one head to another by imitation or education, a theory, which can be compared to the natural selection or genetic replication in biology. However, the evolutionary process presented in economics is a process of learning and imitation; thus, its application in economic is not biological. This is because genetic adaptation and replication are not in any way related to imitation.

The biological problems in life are not related to the challenges that describe economics namely; acquisition, management, and reproduction of the competitive strategy. One important modification of the EGT replica is that it has a particular economic importance, lying on the psychoanalysis of expenses. A replica of expenditure presumes that all the participants experience the equal consequences forced on them by the Game expenses, but this might not be the case as shown by Young (1998 p. 53). In his thinking, he referred to it as to the Handicap Principle. In contrary, the resource holding potential theory (RHP) indicates that the efficient cost to the competitors with superior RHP is not as great as those of a competitor with a lower RHP.

In conclusion, economists and biologists have to make a big step in proving that evolutionary game theory is really a practical theory to be applied in the economic development. If proven, it can play a vital role in such developments, but if left in its current state, it will raise ambiguity; and thus, it might not be of any assistance in the economic advancement.